OSC prosecutions
After being cited by the IMF and the head of the largest non-bank financial institution in Canada as “something of a joke”, the OSC is mulling over changes to the way it does prosecutions. It’s true, their record is not good of late. The article in today’s Globe was short on detail; hopefully there will be more about the actual process.
There are two main theories floating out there: that increased competition among regulators (and exchanges, which do some regulation through standard setting, rather less through prosecution of abuses) will increase enforcement and tighten laws, because investors will demand better standards or go somewhere else. The other theory is that increased competition among regulators and exhcanges will permit issuers to shop around and use the exchange with the least restrictions, because issuers will demand it. There are all kinds of tweaks to these positions, such as home-country bias, liquidity effects and preferences, etc.
Wall St. has just spent 5 years saying that SarOx and Spitzer put the bar too high, and caused issuers to flee to London. They seem to have forgotten Enron. Bay St. would likely have the same reaction, and both seem to support the second of those theories of securities regulation in a global market for capital. The professionals in both those streets have tended to work for issuers and not investors (though some do for institutional investors, who are, despite Claude Lamoreaux, notoriously passive with respect to securities prosecution).
We’ll see what tack the OSC takes.